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8 April 1966

FUTURE US POLICY TOWARD THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY

By

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Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry



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by

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US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
8 April 1966

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SUMMARY

Today, twenty years after the end of World War II, there has not been a final peace settlement between the Allied Powers of World War II and Germany. This is so, not because of lack of interest or effort, but rather, because the Allied Powers have been unable to reach agreement upon the terms of a peace settlement. Meanwhile, Germany has been divided into two principal zones--an East Germany under Soviet influence and a West Germany with a Western orientation--while Berlin remains a divided city deep in Eastern Germany. The eastern part of Germany and East Prussia have been absorbed by Poland and the Soviet Union. None of this dismemberment of Germany has been legitimatized by a peace settlement which would determine Germany's rightful status and borders.

The Cold War between East and West has often been focused upon the present division of Germany. This division has constituted, and will continue to constitute, a grave threat to peace in Europe.

After numerous conferences during World War II among the Allied Powers, the Potsdam Conference seemed to offer some hope that the Allied Powers were in agreement for an eventual unification of Germany through democratic self-determination. Subsequent events have shown that the Soviet Union would settle only for a Communist-oriented Germany, or failing in that, a Communist East Germany.

The United States, the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany continue to insist upon a German settlement which embodies the principles of the Potsdam Declaration.

West Germany is now a strong, democratic state which is closely aligned with the West. East Germany is a weaker, but important, member of the Soviet satellite bloc. Both West and East Germany strongly profess to desire unification.

Various compromise solutions, although they are not likely to be mutually satisfactory to both East and West, are worthy of future consideration. However, for the West, it appears that a continuation of present unification aims, in accordance with the Potsdam Proclamation, is the only acceptable course of action. In this setting, the United States should continue its adherence to its present German policy, although certain minor modifications seem to be in order.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The end of World War II was followed by the rapid emergence and intensification of the Cold War between the Soviet-led Communist bloc and the Free World. Much of the conflict of the Cold War in the last twenty years has centered upon divided Germany. This conflict has continued virtually without letup, and it has threatened at times to plunge the major world powers into war over Germany. In such a setting, the World War II allies have been unable to conclude a peace treaty with Germany. Thus, while Germany awaits a peace settlement to determine her rightful status and borders, she stands divided into West Germany and East Germany while free West Berlin stands like an island deep inside Communist East Germany. In addition, Poland administers half of East Prussia and that portion of Germany lying east of the Oder-Neisse Rivers. President Johnson calls this forced division of Germany a lasting threat to peace.¹ It is a sobering fact that the only place on earth where Soviet and United States soldiers confront each other is along the barrier between East and West Germany. Although numerous efforts have been made to solve the reunification problem, it appears to be no nearer solution than it was at the end of World War II. Granted the threat

¹ Lyndon B. Johnson, "The Atlantic Community: Common Hopes and Objectives," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LI, 21 Dec. 1964, p. 867.

to peace and security that a divided Germany poses, what should be the course of future policy of the United States toward reunification?

PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to determine a future United States policy toward the question of the reunification of Germany. In order to do this, it is helpful to understand the conditions, the reasoning, and the goals which shaped the United States policy toward the defeated Germany of 1945 as discussed in Chapter 2.

In Chapter 3 we shall discuss the Germany of today in terms of West Germany and East Germany.

In Chapter 4 we shall examine the current reunification aspirations and policies of nations which have a vital stake in reunification--principally the USSR, East and West Germany, France, Great Britain, and the United States. The success or failure of United States reunification policy will certainly be influenced by the actions of these other nations.

Chapter 5 will be devoted to alternative United States policy on reunification and some problems involved therein.

Chapter 6 will examine the military implications of reunification as they affect the United States.

The final chapter of this thesis will recommend a future United States policy for dealing with the reunification of Germany.

CHAPTER 2

DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING US POLICY TOWARD GERMANY

In order to understand the problem of reunification as it exists today, it is appropriate to examine the highlights of the early development of United States policy toward post-war Germany.

ATLANTIC CHARTER

The first significant statement on United States post-war aims is found in the Atlantic Charter promulgated by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941. The Charter outlined several important and broad principles which were to guide the United States and the United Kingdom, namely:

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other.

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them . . .¹

The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics formally subscribed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter on January 1, 1942.²

Unfortunately, subsequent events were to show that apparent agreement

¹ US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, World War II International Agreements and Understandings, pp. 1-2 (referred to hereafter as "Congress, World War II International Agreements and Understandings").

²Ibid., pp. 2-3.

upon the broad principles of the Atlantic Charter would not in itself prevent bitter controversy over the frontiers and the future of Germany.

TEHRAN CONFERENCE

At the Tehran Conference in November 1943, Premier Stalin expressed agreement with Roosevelt's long-held view that Germany should be decentralized in such a manner that the ancient and individual states of Germany could regain their independence if they so desired and that the Germany of the future should not include Prussia.³

Meanwhile, within the United States government, there was a major divergency of opinion with regard to the desirability of partitioning Germany. The extreme viewpoints were represented, on one hand, by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, who favored partitioning, and, on the other, by Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, both of whom argued strongly against forcible partitioning.⁴

MORGENTHAU PLAN

The Morgenthau Plan was generally envisioned as a "hard" peace for Germany which would reduce her to an agrarian state.

³Summer Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History, p. 204.

⁴Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. 2, pp. 1604-1609.

With respect to the dismemberment of Germany, the highlights of the Morgenthau Plan were as follows:

1. France should get the Saar.
2. The Ruhr and surrounding industrial areas should be incorporated in an International Zone. All industrial plants should be dismantled and removed.
3. Poland should get the southern part of Silesia and that part of East Prussia which Russia does not get.
4. The remaining portion of Germany should be divided into two autonomous and independent states--a South Germany and a North Germany.⁵

Hull and Stimson both argued that it was impractical to forcibly partition Germany because of the economic, political, and cultural integrity of the entire nation. However, they agreed that the United States should encourage a decentralization of the German government structure and that, if the Germans desired spontaneous partition, the United States should not oppose it.⁶

Morgenthau accompanied President Roosevelt to the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944. At the conference, to the astonishment and displeasure of Hull and Stimson, President Roosevelt and Churchill largely embraced the Morgenthau Plan.⁷ Both Hull and Stimson vigorously protested the President's agreement to the Morgenthau Plan; and in October 1944, President Roosevelt notified Hull that no decision should be taken on the possible partition of Germany. Roosevelt stated that he "disliked making detailed plans for a country which we do not yet occupy."⁸

⁵Henry Morgenthau, Germany Is Our Problem, preface.

⁶Hull, op. cit., pp. 1608-1609.

⁷Ibid., p. 1610.

⁸Ibid., pp. 1621-1622.

CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

The next important international conference concerning the partitioning of Germany occurred at the Crimean (Yalta) Conference in February 1945. Here, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed to a zonal occupation of Germany by all three major powers with France to be invited to occupy a fourth zone if she should so desire. Also, the Yalta Declaration pledged the occupying powers to a common policy for the disarmament, demilitarization, and dismemberment of Germany as might be necessary for the peace and safety of the world.⁹ The main German problem encountered at Yalta concerned the question of whether or not Germany should be cut up into a number of individual states in order to provide security in Europe. James F. Byrnes, the soon-to-be Secretary of State, reports that at Yalta there was general agreement among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin that Germany should be divided into an unspecified number of states. Roosevelt suggested that the Foreign Ministers study the problem and submit recommendations in thirty days. Subsequently, the Foreign Ministers were unable to reach agreement; and by the time of the Potsdam Meeting in July 1945, the thinking of all three governments was against dismemberment.¹⁰

On April 12, 1945, Harry Truman assumed the Presidency of the United States due to the death of Roosevelt. In order to bring

⁹Congress, World War II International Agreements and Understandings, p. 32.

¹⁰James Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 25-26.

President Truman abreast of major foreign policy problems, Secretary of State Stettinius provided him on April 13, with a summary of United States policy. With respect to Germany, the summary stated that United States policy included, among other things, military government to be administered with a view toward political decentralization and controls over the German economy. It further stated that no tripartite or quadripartite agreement had been reached on the treatment of Germany during the period of military government.¹¹ President Truman sent envoys in May 1945 to assure Churchill and Stalin that there had been no change in the basic policies of the United States since his assumption of the Presidency.¹²

With the surrender of Germany on May 8, 1945, the victorious allies commenced the occupation of Germany.¹³ A declaration regarding the assumption of Supreme Authority by the Allied Powers was made public on June 5, 1945. It provided for Germany to be occupied within her frontiers of December 31, 1937. The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France were each assigned a zone to occupy; these zones were those recommended by the European Advisory Commission in 1944.¹⁴ The area of Greater Berlin was to be occupied by forces of each of the Four Powers. An Inter-Allied Governing Authority, consisting of the four

¹¹ Harry Truman, Memoirs of Harry Truman, Vol. 1, p. 16.

¹² Ibid., p. 257.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 206-208.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 213-218.

Commandants, was to jointly administer Berlin. Supreme Authority in Germany was to be exercised by the Four Powers through the Commander-in-Chief of each of the four zones of occupation, acting separately in their own zone and jointly as members of the Allied Control Council in matters affecting Germany as a whole.¹⁵

POTSDAM CONFERENCE

The Potsdam Conference, held in July and August 1945, served to highlight the beginning of the Cold War and the difficulty of unifying Germany. Secretary Byrnes stated that the United States aims at Potsdam included agreement with the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union on the following matters: the machinery and procedures for early completion of peace treaties, the political and economic principles to govern the occupation of Germany, and a new approach to the unsettled reparations issue.¹⁶

The problem of Germany dominated the deliberations at Potsdam. Let us examine some of the highlights of the German problem as treated by the Potsdam Agreement and discuss some of the basic disagreements which emerged during the conference. In order to insure future attention to a German settlement, the Potsdam Conferencees established a Council of Foreign Ministers which was to "be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany

¹⁵Congress, World War II International Agreements and Understandings, pp. 50-60.

¹⁶Byrnes, op. cit., pp. 67-68.

to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the task is established."¹⁷

The Potsdam Agreement reaffirmed the basic principles of the declaration of June 5, on the assumption of authority and the zonal occupation of Germany; however, there remained some ambiguity on the political direction of Germany. Local democratic self-government was to be established; but, for the time being, no central government was to be permitted. Nevertheless, certain essential central German administrative departments were to be established and operate under the Allied Control Council. The purpose of the occupation, as agreed at Potsdam, was to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual German peaceful cooperation in international life.¹⁸

In the field of economics, the Potsdam Agreement stated that the German economy should be decentralized by eliminating excessive concentration of economic power. Primary emphasis in organizing the German economy was to be placed on the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries. During the occupation, Germany was to be treated as a single economic whole with common policies in certain basic and vital fields.¹⁹

¹⁷Congress, World War II International Agreements and Understandings, p. 77.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 66-68.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 68-70.

The Potsdam Agreement announced a plan for reparations from Germany. The plan, as President Truman described it, was "to make it possible for Germany to develop into a decent nation and to take her place in the civilized world."²⁰

At Potsdam, the United States was faced with the fact that, without consultation with either the United States or the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union had transferred all of Germany east of the Oder-Neisse River to Poland for administration; this unilateral action essentially established another occupation zone in Germany. In the process, roughly seven million Germans had been displaced from this former German area. Both the United States and the United Kingdom expressed sharp disapproval of the entire unilateral Soviet action with respect to the Polish administration of the German area.²¹ Subsequently, the Potsdam Agreement declared that the "three heads of government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement."²²

Overall, the Potsdam Conference produced some hope for the emergence of a unified, peaceful, and politically and economically stable Germany; but there were indications of basic differences in the eventual aims of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the

²⁰Truman, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 411.

²¹Byrnes, op. cit., pp. 79-81.

²²Congress, World War II International Agreements and Understandings, p. 73.

United States and the United Kingdom, on the other. President Truman stated that at Potsdam, "the Russians had pledged their signature on a document that promised co-operation and peaceful development in Europe."²³ Nevertheless, he saw the Russians as relentless bargainers who pressed for every possible advantage for themselves and were not in earnest about peace.²⁴ Secretary of State Byrnes left Potsdam with the belief that genuine progress had been made in the agreements about Germany, although he felt that it would be a long time before the Soviets would be willing to start work on a German settlement. Later, Byrnes acknowledged that, although the agreements did make the conference a success, subsequent violations of those agreements turned it into a failure.²⁵

As we have noted, the opinion of United States governmental officials on partitioning of Germany had varied widely up to the close of World War II. However, by the close of the Potsdam Conference in August 1945, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union were in apparent agreement that Germany should not be partitioned. As is well known, subsequent events have led to a partition which isolates West Germany from East Germany and does not provide a free corridor for Western land access to West Berlin. Hanson Baldwin has characterized Berlin as "an island in a Russian sea."²⁶ Annex A shows the present division of Germany.

²³Truman, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 411.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 411-412.

²⁵Byrnes, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

²⁶Hanson Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War, p. 57.

POST-POTSDAM

By 1946, friendly exchanges with the Soviet representatives in Germany were becoming infrequent. Increasingly, the Soviet representatives refused to accept terms of the Potsdam Proclamation which they no longer felt were advantageous to them. The boundary line of the Soviet sector became a barrier which the representatives of the Western Allies could cross only with Russian escort and for specific purposes. It was becoming clear that the Soviet Union did not intend to allow unification of Germany to occur.²⁷

In spite of actions to the contrary, the USSR attempted to convince the Germans that they supported German unification. For example, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, in a speech designed to win German support on July 10, 1946, criticized talk of splitting Germany into autonomous states and said that no territory should be separated from Germany except as a result of a plebiscite.²⁸ In light of the absolute failure of the Russians to match words with deeds, the United States representatives were now convinced that the Soviet government did not desire to resolve German issues. The German economy was rapidly deteriorating and creating conditions favorable for Communist growth.²⁹

On September 6, 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes delivered an important address in Stuttgart, Germany. He had just come from

²⁷Lucius Clay, Germany and the Fight for Freedom, p. 18.

²⁸Byrnes, op. cit., pp. 179-181.

²⁹Clay, op. cit., p. 21.

fruitless sessions in Paris with the Soviets where it had become evident that Allied cooperation on Germany could be had only on the Soviet's terms. In the Stuttgart address, Byrnes recalled the great suffering by the Soviets and the Poles at the hands of Hitler's invading armies. Byrnes noted that, as a result of Yalta, Poland had ceded to the Soviet Union the Polish territory east of the Curzon Line. He stated that, in accordance with Yalta and Potsdam agreements, the United States would support a revision of Poland's western and northern borders in Poland's favor only at the time of the final settlement with Germany. He also pointed out that the United States did not feel that it could deny the French claim to the Saar territory; but, he stated that if the Saar were to be integrated into France, French reparations claims against Germany should be readjusted. Except for these aforementioned territories, Byrnes stated that "the United States will not support any encroachment on territory which is undisputedly German or any division of Germany which is not genuinely desired by the people concerned."³⁰ Byrnes declared that the Americans wanted a democratic central government to be developed and run by Germans and that Americans wanted to help the German people to return their nation to a free and peace-loving nation of the world. This speech is often considered to be the turning point of the occupation, for it gave new hope to the Germans.³¹

³⁰ US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, pp. 61-62 (referred to hereafter as "Congress, German Documents, 1944-1961").

³¹ Marshall Dill, Jr., Germany: A Modern History, pp. 435-436.

Prior to and after Byrnes' important Stuttgart speech, troubles and disagreements mounted between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union and were reflected in matters of reparations, currency reform, the Marshall Plan, and economic progress. By 1947, there was no further attempt to conceal the mutual antipathy which existed between the Soviet and the Western powers. On March 20, 1948, the Soviet representative for the Allied Control Council left the meeting and ended quadripartite government in Germany. A few days later, the Berlin Blockade, which was to last for over a year, began. The Russian position was that Berlin was really in the Soviet zone and that, since joint government of Germany had ended, the Western powers must get out of Berlin. The Western powers, utilizing a massive airlift, maintained their position in West Berlin; and the blockade was lifted by the Soviets on May 12, 1949.³²

Faced with deteriorating conditions between the West and the Soviets, the Western powers encouraged the Germans in their zone to develop a constitution and to form a government for the western zones of Germany. On May 12, 1949, the Basic Law Constitution became law for Western Germany. Elections to the Bundestag were held on August 14, 1949, and the German Federal Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Federal Republic) became operable in 1949.³³ The Federal Republic's increasing stature was recognized in May 1955 when full sovereignty was accorded to West Germany by the three Western powers.

³²Ibid., pp. 428-438.

³³Ibid., pp. 440-442.

The Federal Republic was admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter referred to as NATO). The only limitation upon the Federal Republic was the stipulation that the Western powers would maintain the right to station troops on German soil and the denial of the Federal Republic's right to include Berlin in its territory, since that would endanger Allied rights there.³⁴

In the Soviet zone, the Soviets announced the East German adoption of a constitution and the establishment of the German Democratic Republic (hereinafter frequently referred to as the GDR) on October 7, 1949. The government was Communist-dominated and East Germany became, in fact, a satellite state of the Soviet Union. The GDR signed the Communist Warsaw Security Pact on May 14, 1955.³⁵ Thus, by the close of 1955, there were two separate Germanies, each functioning as a government and each aligned in opposing military, economic, and political blocs. West Berlin stood on an island of freedom about a hundred miles inside the Communist border. In spite of many crises since then and a multitude of diplomatic efforts by the Soviets and the Western Allies, Germany still stands as she did in 1955--divided and without a final peace settlement.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 446-447.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 442-444.

CHAPTER 3

GERMANY TODAY

The purpose of this chapter is to examine West Germany and East Germany as they stand today and to glimpse at their future directions. At the outset, population and area of Germany as shown in Annex B may be helpful.

WEST GERMANY

Political Progress

The Federal Republic is based upon the Bonn Basic Law drawn up in 1949. Although West Germany is a republic, the central government has considerable powers; and the tendency has been to develop these rather than local powers of the states (Lander).¹

An interesting feature of the Basic Law is the provision of Article 24 which states that "The Federation may, by legislation, transfer sovereign powers to international institutions."² Although the Federal Republic is denied membership in the United Nations, it has participated widely in various regional agencies such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT),

¹Marshall Dill, Jr., Germany: A Modern History, pp. 441-442.

²German Information Center, The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, p. 11.

the Common Market, and NATO. The Federal Republic extends direct assistance on a large scale and participates extensively in bilateral aid.³

The Federal Republic has made remarkable progress under the Basic Law. As Marshall Dill has noted, the Bonn Republic has operated in a more stable fashion than the Weimar Republic; and no serious flaws have developed in the Basic Law.⁴ The Basic Law has adequate safeguards for democracy, and a democratic society has fulfilled its promise. There are no signs of sickness, such as fragmentation of parties or alienation of major parts of the electorate who might have been persuaded that they have no stake in the regime. The Bundestag is free in debate and competent in action. The vigorous contests among political parties in the Federal Republic are the kind that strengthen a democracy.⁵

One might well wonder what the status is of the Nazi Party and the Communist Party in the Federal Republic. The highest court in the land banned a Neo-Nazi Party by 1953 and the Communist Party in 1956. No serious inroads have since been made by elements of these extremist groups.⁶

³George C. McGhee, "A Time For Decision," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIII, 26 Jul. 1965, pp. 159-160.

⁴Dill, op. cit., p. 442.

⁵McGhee, op. cit., p. 157.

⁶James Conant, Germany and Freedom, pp. 39-40.

Economic Miracle

Rising from a devastated land and a shattered economy of 1945, the economic recovery and amazing prosperity of the Federal Republic of today is well known as the "miracle" of Germany. It has been made possible by currency reform, Marshall Plan aid, the ability to compete in world markets, and the industrial efficiency of the Germans. Economic progress has been achieved without socialization or emphasis on cartels, and the Federal Republic is devoted to the free enterprise system.⁷

West Germany stands today as one of the great industrial powers of the world; she is prosperous, stable, and influential.⁸ West Germany's Gross National Product (GNP) expanded at over ten percent annually during the 1950's. The rate of increase has slowed in the 1960's, but it is continuing to expand--in 1964, the GNP was \$103 billion, and it is expected to increase six percent in 1965. In 1963, West Germany was second only to the United States in foreign trade.⁹ West Germany's foreign trade has consistently increased since 1950, and in 1964 showed a favorable overall balance comprising \$14.7 billion in imports and \$16.2 billion in exports.¹⁰

⁷Dill, op. cit., pp. 444-445.

⁸US Dept of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce, Overseas Business Reports, OBR-63-156, Dec. 1963, p. 4.

⁹US Dept of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce, Overseas Business Reports, OBR-65-16, Mar. 1965, p. 1.

¹⁰US Dept of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce, Overseas Business Reports, OBR-65-34, Jun. 1965, p. 8.

Although Germany has traditionally been a net importer of food, the degree of self-sufficiency today is less than it was before World War II. Today about one-third of her agricultural requirements must be imported. This is, in part, due to the supposedly temporary loss of the lands east of the Oder-Neisse River (Lower Silesia) as provided for by the Potsdam Agreements.¹¹

Armed Forces

As the Cold War intensified between East and West, there arose an urgent need in the West for a German contribution to defense against Communism. Thus, when the Federal Republic achieved full sovereignty in 1955, it acquired the obligation to raise national armed forces under the auspices of NATO. All of West Germany's armed forces, which are listed as Annex C, are committed to NATO; and the Federal Republic has renounced the use of these forces for national ends.¹² NATO has been, and will be, essential to the security of the Federal Republic. Prudence was shown in creating the German forces by giving the Bundestag power over military affairs, thus preventing their injudicious use as in Hitler's time.¹³

In addition to West German forces, additional NATO forces in West Germany include between five and six United States Army divisions, three United Kingdom Army divisions, and two French divisions.

¹¹US Dept of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce, Overseas Business Reports, OBR-63-134, pp. 5-6.

¹²McGhee, op. cit., p. 159.

¹³Conant, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

There are also sizeable air force units of these three countries stationed in West Germany.¹⁴

Sociological Aspects

An overwhelming majority of West Germans have a generally Western orientation in culture, heritage, and ties. This traditional fact is reinforced by post-war political, economic, and defense arrangements, as well as post-war dealings with the Russian Army and Russian tyranny.¹⁵

The younger generation is an important factor to be reckoned with in considering the future of Germany. It is of interest to note that 60% of the West German people are under forty years of age--few of these people had any significant part in the Nazi period of Germany's past.¹⁶ Thus, they have no strong personal guilt feeling for the misdeeds of Hitler's Germany; and it is logical to assume that they will be less inhibited in pressing for reunification than has been the older generation which harbored knowledge of at least some complicity with the suffering caused by the Germany of World War II.

The West Germans have repudiated their misdeeds of World War II and have done something about them. They have sentenced some 5,500 Germans for committing Nazi war crimes. The 1965 Bundestag extended

¹⁴The Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1964-65, pp. 16-17; 21-25.

¹⁵Gerald Freund, Germany Between Two Worlds, pp. 87-88.

¹⁶McGhee, op. cit., p. 160.

the statute of limitations on war crimes so as to allow further prosecutions. Insofar as is possible, the West Germans have compensated the victims of Nazi persecution by restitution of property valued at approximately DM 42 billion and payment to Israel in the amount DM 3½ billion.¹⁷

By 1964, the Federal Republic had assimilated, since World War II, some 9,697,000 expellees from the German Eastern Territories and elsewhere, and some 3,474,000 "new settlers" from Berlin and the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany.¹⁸ The majority of these people naturally have an abiding concern for the reunification of Germany.

Summary

Clearly, the Federal Republic has made remarkable progress in rejoining the community of nations. For two decades, the West Germans have striven to earn a respectable position in the world. As Ambassador McGhee so well stated recently, "The Free World has welcomed the Federal Republic as a partner in its enterprises, has learned to respect its counsel, has applauded the proven solidarity of its democratic institutions, has admired its economic progress, and has leaned on its military strength."¹⁹ For the future, the United States has a powerful and valuable partner in the Federal Republic of Germany.

¹⁷McGhee, op. cit., p. 160.

¹⁸Helmut Arntz, Facts About Germany, pp. 52-56.

¹⁹McGhee, op. cit., p. 157.

EAST GERMANY

Political Situation

In East Germany, the German Democratic Republic has been in existence since 1949. Its existence is based on a constitution which has only the appearance of liberalism and democracy. There is no doubt that the German Democratic Republic is merely one more satellite state in the Soviet bloc. Since 1949, the source of power in East Germany has always been the Soviet Union.²⁰ The unpopularity of the Soviet oppression in East Germany was dramatically demonstrated in the East German revolt, which started in East Berlin on June 17, 1953. The revolt rapidly spread to other East German cities; but it was eventually put down by the local police, the armed forces of the republic, and by Russian military intervention.²¹

Since the 1953 revolt, the Soviets have concentrated on consolidating the Communist regime in East Germany, now headed by Walter Ulbricht, and binding it even closer to the Eastern bloc. The longer the Soviets are able to keep an East German government in existence, the more difficult it is for the West Germans and the other Western powers to maintain that the Bonn government is the only government capable of speaking for all Germans.²²

²⁰Dill, op. cit., pp. 442-443.

²¹Ibid., pp. 443-444.

²²Freund, op. cit., p. 198.

In the German Democratic Republic, the overwhelmingly predominant political party is the German Socialist Unity Party (commonly referred to as the SED), which is the product of a merger of the Communists with the Social Democrats, as forced upon the latter by the Communists in 1946. The Communists are firmly in control of the SED; furthermore, most of the high offices of State and SED are held by the same individuals.²³

Economic Progress

The East German regime has progressed much slower economically than the Federal Republic, but it has made rather notable progress. The Soviets dismantled manufacturing facilities and collected reparations from East Germany until 1953, at which time their value had reached a total of about 43.6 billion DM. The economic structure in East Germany has been reorganized by either forcibly nationalizing or by forming cooperatives of most private businesses. Although a few purely private enterprises remain, their output in 1961 amounted to only 3.1 percent of the total industrial output.²⁴

According to the GDR Statistical Yearbook, production rose from 1950 (-100) to 1961 as follows: in basic industry to 282, in the metal-processing industry to 414, in light industry (excluding food) to 252. A significant fact is that East Germany is the Eastern bloc's most important producer of machinery.²⁵

²³Arntz, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 25-26.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 28-30.

East Germany must rely on foreign trade in order to survive. Her strong orientation toward the Eastern bloc is shown by the following table:

TABLE 1²⁶

<u>FOREIGN TRADE OF EAST GERMANY</u>		
<u>1961</u>	<u>Exports (%)</u>	<u>Imports (%)</u>
Soviet bloc countries	74.7	75.7
--of which USSR is--	(40.3)	(48.3)
Western Countries	25.3	24.3
--of which Fed Repub is--	(9.7)	(8.9)
TOTAL	100.	100.

A "land reform" consisting of appropriation of land was commenced in 1945. In April 1960, the collectivization of all agriculture was completed.²⁷ In the face of collectivization, farm production has declined; and delivery quotas have not been fulfilled.²⁸

Since 1963, there has been a partial introduction of a New Economic System in East Germany that is tantamount to a declaration of bankruptcy of classic Marxist economics. Under this system, workers, factory managers, and enterprises are measured and rewarded by the profit they produce. This has resulted in more consumer goods being available to the public and some greater incentive to raise production.²⁹

²⁶Ibid., p. 29.

²⁷Ibid., p. 28.

²⁸Franz von Nesselrode, Germany's Other Half, p. 113.

²⁹Arthur J. Olsen, "Since August 13, Everything's Different," New York Times Magazine, 19 Sep. 1965, pp. 37,49.

Armed Forces

Annex C is a recapitulation of the armed forces of East Germany. As is indicated in Annex C, these armed forces number about 110,000 persons. This is about one-fourth the size of the Federal Republic's armed forces. In addition to East German forces, the Soviets maintain twenty army divisions, including ten tank divisions, in the zone. Within easy striking distance, are two Soviet divisions in Poland and four Soviet divisions in Hungary. Soviet and East German divisions are allied in the Warsaw Pact, the counterpart to NATO.³⁰

Sociological Aspects

Since the end of World War II and through 1961, the bleak and oppressive life in Communist-dominated East Germany led some 3,474,000 people to escape to West Germany from East Berlin and the Soviet-occupied zone. This was both good and bad for East Germany: good from the standpoint that it removed from the area a substantial portion of those who possessed the strongest inimical political and religious convictions against the regime; bad from the standpoint that much of the talent and skills needed in East Germany were lost.³¹ On August 13, 1961, Ulbricht's regime built the infamous wall in East Berlin; and, for all intents and purposes, this marked the end of hope for escape for the 17 million

³⁰The Institute for Strategic Studies, op. cit., p. 4.

³¹Arntz, op. cit., p. 25,53.

residents of East Berlin and East Germany. This was a decisive event for East Germany; but, paradoxically, it marked the beginning of a new hope for the people, for it resigned them to some belief that a sort of stable and orderly existence might be forthcoming. In the eyes of the East German people, the prospect of reunification faded with the construction of the wall. Subsequently, some sense of pride has slowly developed in the German Democratic Republic, such as it is.³² Yet, East German national feelings continue to clash with the Communist regime. As Willy Brandt, the Mayor of Berlin, wrote:

Ulbricht will never be able to consolidate this "state" /East Germany/. In every critical situation he fears the danger of revolution. It is not possible to plan anything in the "GDR" without taking into account the hostile attitude of the population toward this regime and the uncertainty which such an attitude produces.³³

Summary

The German Democratic Republic remains an oppressive puppet-state of the Soviet bloc; nevertheless, it has made significant economic progress and is an important contributor to the Eastern bloc in the East-West struggle. At present, it appears that the East German regime, regardless of its unpopularity, will survive for the foreseeable future.

³²Olsen, op. cit., pp. 37; 49-54.

³³Willy Brandt, The Ordeal of Coexistence, p. 100

BERLIN

Deep in the heart of East Germany lies Berlin, where the confrontation of East and West is epitomized by the Communist wall which separates East Berlin from West Berlin. East Berlin has been incorporated into the Communist German Democratic Republic as its capital.³⁴

Insofar as the Western Powers are concerned, Berlin legally remains under the original Four-Power Occupation Statute and four-power control, even though the Soviets have, since 1948, failed to abide by this concept of control. West Berlin, the island of freedom, is protected against Soviet or East German take-over by the three Western Powers and their Allies.³⁵ The strength of this protection has been tested and proven many times in the face of Soviet blockades, demands, ultimatums, and restriction of movement to and from West Berlin.

In spite of the pressures placed upon it by the Soviets, West Berlin stands today, isolated, but proud; prosperous; and relatively stable. She is a tribute to the determination of West Berliners, the Federal Republic, and the major Western Powers that she shall not succumb to Communist pressures to capture her.³⁶

³⁴Arntz, op. cit., p. 19.

³⁵Ibid., p. 20.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 20-23.

EASTERN TERRITORIES OF THE GERMAN REICH

As discussed in Chapter 2, the eastern territories of the German Reich lying east of the Oder-Neisse River were placed by the Potsdam Agreement under Polish administration, except for the northern half of East Prussia, which was placed under Soviet administration. The final disposition of the area was to await the final peace settlement, although it was acknowledged that Poland should receive some compensation for loss of territory in the east.

Since World War II, Poland has expelled from the territory, some 13 million Germans--most of whom have fled to West Germany. Meanwhile, the Federal Republic has steadfastly refused to accept the Oder-Neisse line as final. This is partly because of the desire to retain a bargaining lever for the final peace settlement, and partly because of pressure from the refugees now living in West Germany.³⁷

The continuation of West German claims to the territories to the east of the Oder-Neisse, complicates progress on reunification of Germany. As Henry Kissinger has noted, it provides the Soviets with a convenient excuse for maintaining their hold on East Germany; and, it guarantees that reunification will not occur.³⁸

³⁷Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, pp. 219-220.

³⁸Ibid., p. 220.

CHAPTER 4

PRESENT REUNIFICATION POLICIES AND ASPIRATION OF NATIONS CONCERNED

It is, of course, beyond the power of the United States alone to reunify Germany, for the problem involves the desires and aspirations of major power blocs. The purpose of this chapter is to examine present reunification policies and aspirations of the principal contenders in the problem.

THE SOVIET UNION

It has been said that, since 1917, the Russians have considered Germany to be the core of Europe; consequently, the Russians have never wavered in the belief that if the Soviet Union could get the German people on her side, she could control the whole of Europe.¹ Of course, the Soviet Union has been unsuccessful in subverting West Germany's strong commitment to the Western bloc. Therefore, Soviet policy has been directed at consolidating her hold on East Germany and maintaining the unnatural division of a people and a culture. The Soviet's efforts at consolidation take the form of propaganda declarations for coexistence, compromise, and "thinning out" of military forces in Europe. The Soviet leaders have been vitriolic in verbal attacks aimed at undermining the Federal Republic.²

¹Summer Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History, p. 205.

²Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Kosygin in Berlin on Anniversary of Hitler's Defeat, pp. 5-6.

The Soviet's constant concern over German reunification leads them to react in many directions. For example, they have sensed France to be the Achilles Heel of the NATO partners. Hence, the Soviets concentrate upon France as a means of preventing real progress toward reunification. The Soviet efforts contain two constant elements--building upon the traditional French fear of Germany, and arousing animosity between Paris and Bonn.³

Soviet policy is closely concerted with declarations by the German Democratic Republic. In May 1965, Soviet Chairman A. N. Kosygin, while vigorously condemning the Federal Republic, stated that the Soviet Union shares and supports the goal of the East German regime in its program for uniting the country on democratic and peace-loving foundations.⁴ The East German program is based on the prerequisite of a normalization of relations between an equal East and West Germany. Further steps which could be taken, as announced by Walter Ulbricht in May 1965, include the recognition of all existing borders in Europe; the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Europe; the renunciation by the two Germanies of nuclear armies, as well as joint participation in the control of nuclear arms; non-aggression pacts between NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations; and expansion of cooperation. Further, Ulbricht stated, questions on the reunification of Germany are exclusively reserved for negotiations

³Alvin Rubenstein, "The Soviet Image of Western Europe," Current History, Nov. 1964, pp. 281-282.

⁴Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, op. cit., p. 6.

between the two German states.⁵ As Henry Kissinger noted, "Imperceptively, the Soviet framework for German unity becomes established: that it be negotiated directly by the two German states, which is another way of saying that the East German satellite would be consolidated."⁶

Khrushchev threatened, in February 1959, and subsequently, to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. The threat culminated in June 1964, with the signing of a twenty-year "Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance." This was far from the peace treaty which Khrushchev had so often threatened, and he even took the unusual step of informing the three Western powers in advance of what he was about to do and of assuring them that Russia would continue to control Allied access to West Berlin.⁷

There are several reasons why the Soviet Union is not interested in seeing a reunified Germany, unless it is a Communist-oriented nation. As Kosygin has noted, the war with Hitler's Germany cost the Soviets twenty million lives.⁸ In addition, East Germany has become a valuable and completely responsive trade partner with the Soviet Union. Finally, the division of Germany is synonymous with the solidarity of the Soviet satellite bloc; loss of East Germany would constitute a significant set-back to the march of Communism. By alternating pressure with the spirit of

⁵Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Supplement Report: USSR and Eastern Europe, 10 May 1965, pp. 3-4.

⁶Henry Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 219.

⁷Don Cook, Floodtide in Europe, pp. 152, 166.

⁸Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, op. cit., p. 4.

detente, the Soviet Union can manipulate the German problem so as to create tension and strains in Western solidarity.

EAST GERMANY

As has been stated, Soviet and East Germany are closely aligned in their reunification aims; thus, it is not necessary to recount here the policy and goals of the German Democratic Republic. Ulbricht and his clique admit that the Communists have no chance at present of bringing about a popular resistance movement in West Germany which could overthrow the government; hence, he often speaks now of two equal and independent German states.⁹ To obtain such a recognition would be a major accomplishment for his unpopular regime. It is certain that Ulbricht and company are unwilling to submit to any plan of reunification which would undermine the status of his socialist regime.

OTHER EASTERN BLOC NATIONS

The Soviet bloc is tied together by bonds in economics, security, and political orientation. By and large, the Soviet policies toward the reunification of Germany apply to the bloc countries as a whole, although sometimes for different reasons. Today, the East German regime is supported by other Eastern European countries, partly because of the historical fear of a

⁹Carola Stern, Ulbricht: A Political Biography, p. 192.

united Germany. The Eastern European countries are probably less committed to the existence of a Communist East German regime than they are to a divided Germany.¹⁰

Poland has a vested interest in the problem of German reunification. By terms of the Potsdam Agreement, Poland was allowed to administer the German territory east of the Oder-Neisse Rivers pending a final settlement in a peace treaty. Poland expelled some 13 million Germans from the area, resettled it with Polish population, and has treated it as Polish territory. Since the Federal Republic has refused to accept the Oder-Neisse line as final, Poland has great concern for a reunification which might involve the possible loss of this territory.¹¹

WEST GERMANY

The foremost goal of the Federal Republic is to achieve reunification. Chancellor Erhard summed up the future policies of the Federal Republic to achieve a free, united, and peaceful Germany as follows: "We have no greater desire than to enhance security, stability, and social welfare in the world by solving the Germany question"¹² Erhard further stated that this goal was within the framework of Bonn's continued policies of

¹⁰Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 217-218.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 219-220.

¹²Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, The Bulletin, 27 Apr. 1965, p. 1.

maintaining freedom and peace. He stressed that the goal of German unity is to be achieved only by peaceful means and by Four-Power fulfillment of pledges made in 1945.¹³ The government of the Federal Republic insists that the entire German people shall decide its destiny in self-determination as provided for by the Potsdam Agreements.¹⁴

West Germany has announced several actions to further the goal of reunification. She has endorsed both a united Europe and a strong Atlantic Alliance. She has pursued a policy of building Franco-German friendships, as well as a friendly and co-operative attitude toward the United Kingdom. With regard to the Soviets, the Federal Republic is prepared, as it has been in the past, to conduct talks with the Soviet Union at the chief-of-government level.¹⁵

As a means of developing contacts and building bridges with East Europe, the Federal Republic has exchanged commercial missions with Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia, and has been negotiating to exchange missions with Czechoslovakia.¹⁶ Chancellor Erhard has acknowledged continued adherence to the Hallstein Doctrine (the policy of not establishing diplomatic relations with any nation which recognizes the German Democratic

¹³Ibid., p. 1

¹⁴News from the German Embassy, Chancellor Erhard Delivers Declaration on Government Policy, 15 Nov. 1965.

¹⁵Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 2.

Republic); however, there is slight indication that this doctrine might be abandoned in the future.¹⁷

While the Bonn Government continues its diplomatic battle to keep East Germany in a state of isolation and non-recognition, there has been an increase in West German popular demand for a more flexible and active policy toward East Germany in an effort to transform the Soviet zone. It is quite possible that there will be some effort to extend negotiations with East Germany in such matters as visiting and trading between sectors. Nevertheless, there is not likely to be any negotiation which concedes equality with, or diplomatic status to, the Communist regime.¹⁸

The desire for reunification is so strong today that no West German government or politician can treat reunification as anything other than a major objective. As the post-war generation rises, the objective is likely to become even more urgent.¹⁹ Other nations will be well-advised not to ignore this trend in the coming years.

GREAT BRITAIN

Great Britain's official attitude toward reunification is expressed in the "Three Power Declaration on Germany" (Republic of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) of May 12, 1965. The declaration confirms the obligation which the three powers and

¹⁷News from the German Embassy, Chancellor Erhard Makes Declaration for Peace, Freedom, and the Unity of Germany, 15 Nov. 1965, p. 1.

¹⁸Cook, op. cit., pp. 335-337.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 333-334.

the Soviet Union share for solving the German problem, including Berlin and access thereto, and pledges further study for approaching the Soviet Union in order to accomplish useful results. The declaration notes that failure to achieve a real solution based on the exercise in the two Germanies of the right of self-determination is unsettling peace in Europe and is against the interests of the German people and all other peoples concerned.²⁰

Although the British Government seems to be firmly committed to an acceptable solution of the German problem, there always exists the political pressures which play upon British leaders, as well as other national leaders, to establish direct bilateral contacts with the Soviets in an effort to appear as the arbiter of a final settlement. Such bilateral dealing might be to the detriment of the Western alliance or to Germany as a whole.

In spite of declarative government policy supporting the reunification of Germany, there are some who believe that Britain, as well as France, is not genuinely enthusiastic about the reunification of Germany. One can argue that neither Britain nor France look forward with equanimity to the prospects of a reunified Germany of seventy million people which would be by far the strongest power in Europe.²¹

²⁰ British Information Services, Three Power Declaration on Germany, 12 May 1965.

²¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition, pp. 138-139.

FRANCE

World Wars I and II created in France a deep fear and distrust toward Germany. Accordingly, at the end of World War II, France favored a decentralization or partitioning of Germany, as well as putting the Ruhr under international control and keeping Germany disarmed. However, the rise of the East-West conflict and the basic qualities of the German people have caused France's attitude to change. President DeGaulle has stated the French goals toward Germany as follows: ". . . to see that Germany henceforth becomes a definite element of progress, and peace; on this condition, to help with its reunification; to make a start and select the framework which would make this possible."²² For reunification to occur, President DeGaulle believes that Russia must alter its actions in such a way that it sees its future, not through totalitarian restraint imposed on others, but through progress accomplished in common by free men and peoples.

DeGaulle believes that the German problem can be resolved only by Europe herself.²³ Such an attitude seems to exclude the joint responsibility of the United States and Great Britain as expressed in the previously discussed "Three Power Declaration on Germany" of May 12, 1965. It weakens purposeful Western action for solving

²²Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, President DeGaulle Holds Eleventh Press Conference, Speeches and Press Conference No. 216, 4 Feb. 1965, pp. 10-11.

²³Ibid., p. 12.

the reunification problem, and it places difficult counter-pressures on the Federal Republic's aims at reunification.

Neither the United States nor the Federal Republic accept the idea that the German problem can be solved solely by France, the Soviet Union, and Germany's neighbors to the east and west.

DeGaulle's talks with visiting Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in early May 1965, on the subject of reunification, appeared to the Bonn government to be a sacrifice of German interests in the cause of French nationalism.²⁴

DeGaulle has accepted the Oder-Neisse boundary as the basis for settlement of the German eastern boundary. In summary, it can be said that DeGaulle's view of reunification differs considerably from the declarative positions of the other Western allies.²⁵

Many persons in France continue to harbor distrust and suspicion of Germany. It would undoubtedly be easier for France to reach full accord with a West Germany which would remain what she is now in constitution, alliances, and borders. However, West German sentiment for reunification forces France to seek accommodation with this force. Polls have shown that in the last nine years an increasing number of Frenchmen are of the opinion that France and Germany must be allies and friends, and that Germany is not necessarily dangerous to France. Thus, the reunification

²⁴ Arthur Olsen, "U.S. Upholds Role on Germany, Spurns Paris Plan on Settlement," New York Times, 10 May 1965, p. 4.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 4.

of Germany seems to be somewhat more acceptable to Frenchmen now than it did ten years ago.²⁶

THE UNITED STATES

Ever since the close of World War II, the United States has championed German reunification on the basis of self-determination. The United States has never accepted the division of Germany as permanent. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has opposed reunification on any basis satisfactory to the United States.²⁷ The highest officials of the United States have made countless reaffirmations of the United States aims toward Germany.

On May 25, 1965, President Johnson stated:

. . . we must work for the reunification of Germany. The people of Germany, east and west, must be allowed to choose their own future. The Four Powers have special responsibilities for Germany and Berlin. The shame of the Eastern Zone must be ended. It serves the real interests of none. We must set the Germans free, while still meeting history-laden concerns that all understand. The United States is ready to play its full part in such arrangements.²⁸

Thus, the goal of present United States policy is clear; it is the implementation of the policy which has met with frustration

²⁶ Rene Lauret, France and Germany, pp. 260-266.

²⁷ George C. McGhee, "A Frank Look at Some Current Issues in German-American Relations," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIII, 6 Dec. 1965, p. 905.

²⁸ Lyndon B. Johnson, "The 20th Anniversary of V-E Day," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LII, No. 1352, 24 May 1965, p. 792.

and difficulty. The past twenty years have seen the hardening of positions vis-a-vis East and West, and reunification does not appear to soon be in the offing.

The United States has embarked upon a program of building bridges to the nations of Eastern Europe by increasing the flow of peaceful trade between Eastern Europe and the United States. Such a plan is part of the effort to hasten the erosion of the Iron Curtain.²⁹ It appears that the East German regime will tend to be isolated and weakened by a United States policy of selective trade with nations in Eastern Europe.

In the face of official United States policy, some observers believe that the United States considers the present situation in Germany and Europe reasonably satisfactory. With the tensions that are invariably accentuated among Western allies when broad plans of settlement of the German problem or the European confrontation are proposed, the United States has preferred, according to some observers, to de-emphasize such plans and to emphasize NATO unity and Atlantic Community interests. There has been a growing demand among some prominent Americans, including Senators Mansfield, Church, Pell, and Morse, that the United States adopt a more vigorous policy toward settlement of the German problem.³⁰

²⁹Ibid., p. 792.

³⁰Richard Barnett and Marcus Raskin. After 20 Years; Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe, pp. 123-125.

CHAPTER 5

FUTURE UNITED STATES POLICY: ALTERNATIVES AND PROBLEMS

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss future United States policy toward Germany in conjunction with alternatives and problems which the policy might involve.

IS REUNIFICATION A PROPER GOAL?

The first consideration is to determine whether or not the goal of reunification itself is a proper one. Should the United States accept the status quo of the two Germanies with an isolated West Berlin? The answer to this is an unequivacable "No!" Perhaps, to some Americans, a continuation of the status quo of the past and the absence of war over the situation form an acceptable solution for the future. However, the acceptance of such a solution would have a devastating effect upon the Federal Republic. As we have already indicated in Chapter 4, the spirit of reunification in the Federal Republic is so strong that the whole fabric of Western unity and strength would be shattered by United States acceptance of the present status quo. Also, acceptance of the status quo would amount to a Western sacrifice of its principles and its aims of giving hope of greater freedom to the peoples of central and eastern Europe.¹ Silent acceptance of the

¹Gerald Freund, Germany Between Two Worlds, p. 282.

division of Germany cannot hope to command German adherence or loyalty to the West or to keep the peace for long.² There would seem to be little doubt that the Federal Republic, if it were to be deserted in its national cause, might turn to the Soviet Union for further achievement of its goals; this would be a momentous set-back to the West. On the other hand, a free and united Germany, which had freely chosen to reunite and with its borders settled, would be a source of stability in European affairs. The attainment of such a Germany is very properly a goal of United States policy.

A UNITED AND NEUTRALIZED GERMANY

The forced establishment of a unified and neutralized Germany might be a situation which the Soviets would some day accept. However, there is little likelihood that such a regime could exist with any degree of stability so long as there is an East-West conflict among the major powers. It is not difficult to imagine the external stresses and attempts at subversion that would face such a Germany. A nation of Germany's inherent strength, with its strategic geographical position, could hardly withstand the pressures that would inevitably be placed upon it to align itself with one or the other power blocs. If a reunified Germany were to voluntarily choose a policy of neutralization, it might survive; but

²Dean Acheson, "Europe: Decision or Drift," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 2, Jan. 1966, p. 204.

it would be inimical to Western interests for the Four Powers to arbitrarily impose or maintain such a condition upon Germany.

CONFEDERATION OF TWO GERMANIES

As was discussed in Chapter 4, the Soviet Union and East Germans propose, as a prerequisite to a unification of Germany, the establishment of normal relations between two equal Germanies which would work out their own destiny. The obvious advantage of this to the Communists would be the immediate recognition of the East German regime as a peer of West Germany. Would such a plan serve the interests of the West? Insofar as West Germany is concerned, it would not be acceptable to allow a Communist-puppet regime which does not represent the freely expressed interests of the East German people, to achieve the recognition which the plan would bestow upon it; nor does it appear to be in the interests of the United States. Such a plan might make reunification even more remote.

The United States might consider advocating that a confederation be established between West and East Germany, if the East German government were based on genuine and monitored free elections. The confederation could be established for a predetermined number of years, at the end of which free elections would be held to determine whether the two states desired reunification. Such a plan, with additional ramifications, is advocated by Henry Kissinger.³ It is

³Henry Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, pp. 220-222.

likely that the Soviets would reject the plan due to the free election requirement; however, the proposal of such a plan would, at least, put the Soviets in an uncomfortable position and would give the West an initiative and a fresh approach in negotiating with the Soviets. However, a change in private and official sentiment would have to occur in West Germany before that state would accept a confederation; nevertheless, with proper leadership, such a change might occur.

On balance, a confederation of the two Germanies seems to offer little hope of providing a free and united Germany. The recognition by the West of an East German regime would be a victory for the Soviets, who could be expected to frustrate the further consolidation and emergence of a free Germany.

CONCERT OF POLICY

Fundamental to progress in reunification is a concerting of Western policy toward reunification. Without a common purpose and policy, the West cannot act with purpose. Bilateral negotiations with the Soviets are a divisive influence on the West and arouse fears and pressures in the Federal Republic.⁴ At present, there does not appear to be a common Western purpose and policy. Most certainly, DeGaulle's view that the solving of the German problem must be by 'Europeans alone' (see Chapter 4), places the West at odds on policy and places the Federal Republic in a difficult

⁴Ibid., pp. 205-206.

position. In developing a common Western program, the Federal Republic should be required to contribute and concert its idea with the other Western powers. Dean Acheson clearly expressed the point as follows:

My thesis is that in making political and military judgements affecting Europe, a major, and often the major, consideration should be the effect on the German people and the German government. It follows from this that the closest liaison and consultation with the German government is an absolute necessity Unexpected or unexplained action nearly always causes consternation in Germany. Sensible decision after careful consultation, even when there has been some difference of view, rarely does.⁵

WESTERN DEALINGS WITH EAST GERMANY

A continual question which must be faced is that of what kind of relations the West should establish with East Germany as they affect the reunification of Germany.

Insofar as East Germany is concerned, the West should continue non-recognition of the regime. The United States and the Federal Republic are in agreement that until Germany is unified, only the freely elected and legitimately constituted government of the Federal Republic can speak for the German people.⁶ Such a policy will continue to place pressure upon the East German regime and will tend to isolate it and deny its acceptance as a

⁵Dean Acheson, The Dilemmas of Our Times, p. 17.

⁶Lyndon Johnson and Ludwig Erhard, "US and Germany Reaffirm Agreement on East-West Problems," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. L, 29 Jun. 1964, p. 993.

legitimate regime in the world community. On the other hand, West Germany should broaden its contacts with East Germany by encouraging free travel between the Soviet sector and free West Germany and West Berlin; expanding cultural exchanges; and developing humanitarian cooperation. Such contacts would tend to erode the oppressive East German regime.

The ostracism of East Germany can be increased by the Western powers treating East European states other than East Germany as if they were fully independent states. These East European states have a nationalist fervor which ultimately works against their domination by the Soviets. If the Western powers encourage and respond to foreign policy proposals by these East European states, while refusing to deal with East Germany, the credibility of the East German regime will be seriously weakened. Thus, the Soviets may come to the realization that East Germany is a liability which can be liquidated through reunification on terms acceptable to the West.⁷

ODER-NEISSE LINE

It would appear that the unification of Germany would be hastened if the Federal Republic were to renounce its claim to territories east of the Oder-Neisse Line. Although the Potsdam Agreement provides full justification for awaiting a final peace

⁷Z. K. Brzezinski, "Peaceful Engagement," Encounter, Vol. XXIV, Apr. 1965, pp. 19-20.

conference for the settlement of this frontier, the willing renunciation of this by the Federal Republic would have several good effects. First, Poland would have less reason to oppose the reunification of Germany, since it would not involve loss of territory which Poland lays claim to. Second, it would allay the fears among other East European nations of the emergence of a revanchist and unified Germany. Third, it would remove one Soviet excuse for maintaining Soviet troops on East German soil.

Such a renunciation would have to be proposed with great care in the Federal Republic, for it would be unpopular there now and might cause a government crisis. In the long-term, however, it would serve the German interests.

BERLIN

The problem of Berlin must be solved in context with a general settlement of German reunification. The Western Allies must maintain the right to station troops in Berlin and must assure the West Berliners and the Communist world of the continued responsibility of the Western Powers to maintain the independence and viability of the city until a peace settlement is reached. The West should continue to refuse to recognize the authority of German Democratic Republic to control Western access to Berlin. It does not appear to be practicable in the foreseeable future to provide a United Nations presence in Berlin to replace the Western Allies.

ATTITUDE TOWARD ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The final goal of Atlantic partnership and European integration is the negotiation of a basic settlement with the Soviet Union. The reunification of Germany would be one of the products of such a settlement.⁸ It follows that the United States should pursue policies which strengthen Western Europe and the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Such cooperative ventures as EURATOM, the Common Market, the Europe Free Trade Association, the Europe Coal and Steel Community, and Nato, all enhance the position of the West. The impact of a prosperous, viable, and cohesive Western Europe and Atlantic Partnership will have an ameliorating effect upon the nations of Eastern Europe. President Johnson has asserted that we must build bridges between the nations of Eastern Europe and the West in order to erode the Iron Curtain and reconstitute Europe.⁹ Increasing free trade with the countries of Eastern Europe other than East Germany would appear to speed the eventual reunification of Germany.

SUMMARY

In this chapter we have discussed a number of problems which are related to the future reunification of Germany. Consideration

⁸Dean Acheson, "Europe: Decision or Drift," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, Jan. 1966, p. 205.

⁹Lyndon Johnson, "The 20th Anniversary of V-E Day," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LII, 24 May 1965, p. 792.

of each of them should be related to the critical importance of achieving a concerted Western policy. Without a concerted Western policy, it is probable that Western unity will be seriously weakened and that unification will never be attained.

CHAPTER 6

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF REUNIFICATION

INTRODUCTION

We have seen how the reunification of Germany is related to larger issues such as the unity of Europe, Atlantic partnership, and an eventual overall settlement between the West and the Soviet bloc. Let us now turn to an examination of some of the military implications of reunification.

SOVIET MILITARY POWER

We have already seen in Chapter 3 that, in addition to a GDR regular armed force composed of approximately 110,000 persons, the Soviets maintain twenty Soviet army divisions in East Germany while six Soviet divisions are stationed in Poland and Hungary within easy striking distance of East Germany. Soviet-satellite armies and the USSR are allied by the Warsaw Pact.

Lest there be any doubt about the purpose of Soviet troops, Dean Acheson quotes a statement made by Khrushchev in November 1963, which said that Soviet troops are not stationed in East Germany for reasons of any economic advantage; they are there for entirely political purposes to further Soviet goals. As Mr. Acheson points out, the correlation of military power is a major factor in the resolution of political issues. The Soviet purpose

is to undermine the Federal Republic, detach the Federal Republic from the Western alliance, and attach a new all-German regime to the Soviet bloc.¹ Until this purpose has been accomplished, there is scant hope for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. However, at least a ray of hope is possible in the event of a worsening of the Soviet-Sino rift. Such an event might make it fortuitous for the Soviets to reach a settlement in Central Europe in order to be free to concentrate elsewhere against a China which could menace Russian interests elsewhere.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

For the Western side, the essence of the effort to counter Soviet military and political strength in Europe has been the formation, strengthening, and integration of NATO. In NATO, the largest contingent of conventional military might in Europe has been, and undoubtedly will continue to be, the armed forces of the Federal Republic. Although NATO is at present torn by dissension, principally in the form of DeGaulle's view of Atlantic partnership and European unity, it appears obvious that NATO in some form must survive. In the harsh light of the realities of Soviet power and aims, the West must be prepared to meet power with greater power. If NATO should be replaced by a weak and nationalistic tendency on the part of small Western states, the Soviet position in Europe

¹Dean Acheson, The Dilemma of Our Times, p. 16.

would be infinitely strengthened; this would make the Western goal of a Germany reunified on a basis of self-determination an unobtainable goal.

NUCLEAR ARRANGEMENTS

At present, there is a strong desire on the part of the Federal Republic to obtain a voice in nuclear defense. On December 21, 1965, a joint communique issued by President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard expressed agreement that the Federal Republic and other interested partners in NATO should have an appropriate voice in nuclear defense. Erhard emphasized that the Federal Republic neither intended nor desired to acquire national control over nuclear weapons. Both the President and the Chancellor agreed that discussion should be continued to seek an arrangement which would give the Federal Republic and other interested countries an appropriate role in nuclear defense.²

It is certain that whatever role the Federal Republic might acquire over nuclear defense would be the target of a vociferous Communist propaganda drive to convince the East European countries that West Germany is a revanchist and aggressive war-like state harboring aggressive designs against the Communist bloc. This propaganda would surely arouse strong resistance in the Communist bloc against the reunification of Germany. As President Johnson noted in the aforementioned communique, the deterrent power of

²Lyndon Johnson and Ludwig Erhard, "The Johnson-to-Erhard Communique," New York Times, 21 Dec. 1965, p. 10.

the alliance has proven completely effective in the past.³ Therefore, in the interests of reunification, it appears that the United States should, if possible, dissuade the Federal Republic from seeking a more active role in nuclear defense.

A PRO-SOVIET GERMANY

If the unification of Germany were to result in a Germany aligned with the Soviet Union, the West would be in an untenable military position. The military potential of a pro-Soviet Germany, combined with the military and political aims of the Soviet Union, could overwhelm Europe in a matter of time. Therefore, the West must never consent to a settlement of the German problem which allows any chance of the emergence of a pro-Soviet Germany. Memories of World War II are all too fresh to merit the need for further comment on this situation.

NEUTRALIZED GERMANY

In Chapter 5, we discussed the unfavorable general ramifications of an externally-imposed state of neutralization on Germany. A special comment is appropriate as to the military aspects of such a condition.

If the neutralization were accompanied by a pull-back of Soviet and NATO forces, the results might be more unfavorable to the West

³Ibid., p. 10.

than to the Soviets. The elimination of Federal Republic's armed forces from NATO would probably be a mortal blow to the defensive strength of NATO. Further, with the present inclination of DeGaulle to disassociate France from NATO and to forbid NATO units being stationed on French soil, there would literally be insufficient land area on which to station a credible NATO defense force. Soviet forces, on the other hand, could be located in Poland and Hungary where they could still menace a neutralized Germany. For the future, neutralization of Germany does not appear militarily feasible. Such a result would destroy the Atlantic Alliance and make the Soviets dominant in Europe.⁴

NON-AGGRESSION PACT

As noted in Chapter 3, one of the acts which the East Germans and the Soviets would like to consummate is a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations. Certainly, aggression against East Europe is not likely to be undertaken by NATO. If a non-aggression pact were to be concluded, one of the professed Communist fears of the West would be allayed. Both the Soviets and Eastern European nations would tend to fear Germany less, and a rallying cry over the reunification of Germany would be lost. Already, the Federal Republic is pledged not to use force to reunify Germany.⁵ It, therefore, appears that a military non-aggression

⁴Acheson, op. cit., pp. 14-17.

⁵Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, The Bulletin, 27 Apr. 1965, p. 1.

pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations would contribute to a lessening of tensions and would make the possibility of reunification of Germany more likely.

SUMMARY

The reunification of Germany is inextricably bound up with the military ramifications of such action; unfortunately, most of the possible reunification alternatives would result in such serious military repercussions that they are not acceptable to the West on the basis of military considerations alone. Therefore, it is vital that the relationship of reunification and resultant military implications be constantly kept before those working for reunification. For what does it profit us to reunify Germany if we lose Europe?

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this paper is to determine a future United States policy toward the reunification of Germany. We have traced the war-time origin of the policy which led to the division of Germany. We have noted the development of West Germany, East Germany, and Berlin as they stand today. We have examined the present-day policies of the nations most concerned with reunification, and we have seen some of the foremost problems which are involved, particularly as they concern the United States.

One cannot help but conclude that reunification is unlikely to be achieved in the foreseeable future. Yet, the German problem is with us; and we cannot ignore it or minimize its importance. We have seen that the Federal Republic, as well as the United States, is absolutely dedicated to the achievement of reunification through self-determination. If the United States should declare its future non-support of the goal, no one can tell where West Germany would go in its search for fulfillment of its national goal.

In light of the political and military realities which exist in Europe today, there is not much room for significant future change in United States policy on the reunification problem. Nevertheless, it is proper to point out the following as guideposts to future United States policy toward the reunification of Germany:

a. Reunification through self-determination is a proper goal for the United States. The United States should intensify its efforts to bring about reunification through self-determination as a basis for European peace.

b. It is all-important that Western efforts to achieve reunification be concerted and harmonized. Bilateral negotiations with the Soviets sow the seeds of discord and suspicion in the Western alliance. West German participation in a program of reunification is essential to progress.

c. A strong, prosperous, and unified Europe and an equally strong Atlantic partnership are important to progress on reunification. Individualistic and purely nationalist sentiments among Western European nations are obstacles to hastening the erosion of the Iron Curtain and the reunification of Europe.

d. A renunciation by the Federal Republic of territorial aims east of the Oder-Neisse Line would create a better climate for reunification.

e. A renunciation by the Federal Republic of aims to secure a voice in nuclear defense would eliminate one important Communist propaganda weapon toward West Germany. Present nuclear arrangements are adequate as a deterrent to Soviet aggression.

f. A non-aggression pact between NATO and members of the Warsaw Pact would lessen tension in Eastern Europe and would further the cause of reunification.

g. The United States should pursue a policy of non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic and should seek to isolate it in the international community. A program by the Western allies of "building bridges" to the countries of Eastern Europe will increase the isolation of East Germany.

h. The United States should continue to insist on the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement which provide that the Four Powers hold responsibility for the settlement of the Berlin problem and, ultimately, of the German problem as a whole.

i. The United States should maintain a policy of firmness with patience. No short-term reunification solution should be entered into which will not guarantee the long-term interests of the West and the German people.

j. The United States should fully support and understand West Germany's concern for the anguish of her divided country and people. We must not risk alienation of the West German leaders and their people by lack of understanding.

k. The United States should work in close harmony with the Federal Republic to build a strong, prosperous, and democratic West Germany.

l. If negotiations to reunify Germany fail, the United States and the West should carry the propaganda battle to the Soviets and the world. The onus for the continued division of Germany should rest upon the Communists.

If the United States follows the above guidelines on future policy toward Germany, we can hope that eventually the schism of Germany will be healed and that Germany, reunified through self-determination, will take its rightful place in the world.

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
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MAP OF GERMANY, 1964



ANNEX B

POPULATION AND AREA COMPARISON - GERMANY (1964).

<u>POPULATION AND AREA COMPARISON - GERMANY (1964).¹</u>		
	<u>Population (million)</u>	<u>Area (Sq Mi)</u>
Federal Republic	55.0	95,745
West Berlin	2.3	186
East Berlin	1.6	156
GDR (East Germany)	16.0	41,380
Polish Administered Area (East of Oder-Neisse)	8.5	39,032

¹ Helmut Arntz, Germany Reports - IV, Land and People, pp. 10-12.

ANNEX C

ARMED FORCES OF WEST AND EAST GERMANY

1. ARMED FORCES OF FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY - 1965.¹

Total Strength - 430,000

Army - 274,000 (Seven infantry divisions, three armored divisions, one mountain division, one airborne division.)

Navy - 30,000 (Comprises a miscellany of ships and craft with chief combat element being ten destroyers.)

Air Force - 92,000 (Ten fighter-bomber squadrons, four interceptor squadrons, six reconnaissance squadrons, six transport squadrons, six Nike/Hercules battalions, eight Hawk battalions.)

2. ARMED FORCES OF GDR - 1965.²

Total Strength (regular forces) - 110,000

Army - 80,000 (Two Army Corps totaling two armored divisions and four motorized divisions.)

Navy - 15,000 (Includes a miscellany of ships and craft with chief combat element being four destroyers.)

Air Force - 15,000 (Two Air Divisions totaling 400 interceptor and fighter-bomber aircraft.)

Para-military forces (non-regular) - 70,000 (Security and border troops.)

¹The Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1964-1965, pp. 17-18.

²Ibid., p. 7.